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Tying Arrangements and Lawful Alternatives: 
Transaction Cost Considerations  
Herbert Hovenkamp 
 
Introduction 
A tie-in might serve competition by promoting product quality and protecting the 
supplier's goodwill in the tying product.
1
 When the tying product works effectively only 
with ancillary materials or accessories or services of a particular quality, its supplier can 
assure the requisite quality of the ancillary product only by supplying that product itself. 
The cost savings defense and the defenses of quality control or good will are the most 
widely recognized and accepted tying defenses. 
One characteristic of manufactured products is differentiation among the offerings of 
various brands.  This in turn produces a need for more specialized provision of such 
things as supplies, aftermarket parts, and service.  As a consequence firms often 
“dedicate” their production and organization to ongoing relationships with a narrow 
range of other firms.
1
  Franchising is an extreme case of this, where a McDonald’s 
franchisee may be organized to do business exclusively with its franchisor.  Tying is 
often a mechanism by which firms in such a relationship can carry out what amounts to 
a jointly contemplated business plan.  Another result is that often firms simply cannot 
trust other firms to produce specialized goods that work well with the manufacturer’s 
own equipment.  Independent manufacturers may have a tendency to serve too many 
brands – for example, by making their printer cartridges compatible with numerous 
brands of printers – but such generic production may involve sacrifices in performance.   
In this case tying may become the mechanism by which a firm ensures that its own 
primary product plus aftermarket products will work together well. In this particular 
situation the transaction costs of dealing with others are too high in relation to the costs 
and benefits of simply producing for oneself.
 2
 
                                                          
1
See also 9 ANTITRUST ¶ 1717 on consumer convenience or cost savings, which might also bear on 
the “quality” of the tying product.  On the development of franchising and other organized distribution 
arrangements that included tying as methods of quality control, see Herbert Hovenkamp, The Law of 
Vertical Integration and the Business Firm: 1880-1960, 95 IOWA L. REV. 863, 884–87 (2009).  See also 
Edward M. Iacobucci, Tying as Quality Control: A Legal and Economic Analysis, 32 J. LEGAL STUD. 435 
(2003). 
1
 See OLIVER E. WILLIAMSON, THE MECHANISMS OF GOVERNANCE 59–70 (1996); Benjamin Klein, 
Robert G. Crawford & Armen A. Alchian, Vertical Integration, Appropriable Rents, and the Competitive 
Contracting Process, 21 J.L. & ECON. 297 (1978); Alan J. Meese, Tying Meets the New Institutional 
Economics: Farewell to the Chimera of Forcing, 146 U. PA. L. REV. 1 (1997); see also Edward 
Iacobucci, A Switching Costs Explanation of Tying and Warranties, 37 J. LEGAL STUD. 431 (2008). 
2
 The argument is elaborated in Herbert Hovenkamp, Harvard, Chicago and Transaction Cost 
Economics in Antitrust Analysis, 55 ANTITRUST BULL. 613 (2010), available at 
http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1592476. 
Electronic copy available at: http://ssrn.com/abstract=1763386
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What virtually all of these situations have in common is that they occur in markets 
that involve differentiated, typically branded products and fairly specialized aftermarket 
products or services.  Although the variations are too numerous for comprehensive 
discussion here, the following examples are typical. IBM once insisted that users of its 
data processors of the 1930s use only its blank cards (on which users punched holes 
representing data) on the ground that the machine would malfunction with cards that 
were too thick or dirty.
3
 General Motors once insisted that its dealers use only GM-made 
repair parts on the ground that other parts would impair the auto's functioning or 
durability, for which consumers would blame GM.
4
 In the 1950s, Jerrold Electronics 
installed its rural cable television systems without additional charge in order to assure 
their proper functioning, purchaser satisfaction, and hence the manufacturer's 
reputation.
5
 Microsoft claimed that its bundling of the Internet Explorer (IE) browser and 
the Windows operating system made it easier for third-party software developers to 
develop programs for Windows, because they could anticipate that unique IE interfaces 
would already be installed and did not have to be reproduced on each software 
program; further, these benefits could not be obtained via design specifications.
6
 
Similarly, a manufacturer of a complex or delicate machine may, in effect, require 
users to have the machine serviced by the manufacturer's own representatives. The 
manufacturer might fear that outside repairers would damage the machine in ways that 
the manufacturer could not prove to be attributable to faulty service. The reputation of 
the machine may suffer, and the manufacturer may even have to bear the cost of 
restoring the machine. Such service by the manufacturer may also be the means for 
learning about operating problems of the tying and tied products and adjusting or 
improving them. Reputation may also be at stake when fast-food franchisors insist upon 
supplying franchisees with the spices and pizza dough, generating the distinctive flavor 
or quality that consumers associate with the franchisor's trademark.
7
 As a result tying 
                                                          
3
IBM Corp. v. United States, 298 U.S. 131, 134 (1936) (“To insure satisfactory performance by 
appellant's machines it is necessary that the cards used in them conform to precise specifications as to size 
and thickness, and that they be free from defects due to slime or carbon spots, which cause unintended 
electrical contacts and consequent inaccurate results”; tie condemned). 
4
Pick Mfg. Co. v. Gen. Motors Corp., 80 F.2d 641 (7th Cir. 1935), aff'd per curiam, 299 U.S. 3 (1936) 
(insufficient effects); Gen. Motors Corp., 34 F.T.C. 58 (1941) (illegal). 
5
United States v. Jerrold Elec. Corp., 187 F. Supp. 545 (E.D. Pa. 1960), aff'd per curiam, 365 U.S. 
567 (1961) (tie illegal though once justified). 
6
United States v. Microsoft Corp., 253 F.3d 34, 90 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 534 U.S. 952 (2001). The 
court did not pass judgment on these claims but used them as a basis for deciding that the tie should be 
remanded for consideration under the rule of reason. The government subsequently dropped the tying 
claim. (To the extent it is relevant, H.H. was consulted by the federal and some state governments.) 
7
E.g., Siegel v. Chicken Delight, 448 F.2d 43 (9th Cir. 1971), cert. denied, 405 U.S. 955 (1972) 
(illegal tie). See also Queen City Pizza v. Domino's Pizza, 124 F.3d 430 (3d Cir. 1997), cert. denied, 523 
U.S. 1059 (1998) (tie necessary to maintain product uniformity and consistency across franchises); Krehl 
v. Baskin-Robbins Ice Cream Co., 664 F.2d 1348, 1354 (9th Cir. 1982) (sale of substandard products 
under the company trademark would dissipate goodwill and reduce the value of the mark); Little Caesar 
Enters. v. Smith, 34 F. Supp. 2d 513 (E.D. Mich. 1998) (similar); Collins v. Dairy Queen, 939 F. Supp. 
875 (M.D. Ga. 1996) (rejecting defendant's argument that franchisor approval of products and suppliers 
was essential to quality control). 
Electronic copy available at: http://ssrn.com/abstract=1763386
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products from a particular source or of a particular quality is often associated with 
arrangements that involve trademark licensing, such as franchises.
3
  Or a hospital may 
make its operating rooms safe and effective by insisting that patients use only the highly 
qualified anesthesiologists it employs.
8
 
In these examples, the tie-in allows the supplier of a tying product (tabulator, 
computer operating system, auto, cable system, machine, trademark, or operating 
room) to protect its quality against the degradation that would result from use of an 
inferior or incompatible tied product (cards, Internet browsers, parts, installation, 
service, spices or other consumable ingredients, or unqualified anesthesiologists, 
respectively). Promoting quality benefits the purchaser and, thereby, the supplier's own 
reputation and future sales. 
The kind of tie that might be justified or the kind of less restrictive alternative that 
might be preferable varies with the exact contours of the quality-control claim. Consider 
a defendant who wishes to observe closely the tying (or tied) product's operation and 
failures in actual use in order to improve it or the ancillary products that work with it. 
Product improvement is certainly a legitimate end. To achieve it, the defendant requires 
users of the tying product to take a second product. For on-site observation of the tying 
product, the tied product would be repair service, which has perhaps been bundled into 
the tying-product price. If the performance of certain repair parts or ancillary materials or 
attachments is at stake, the defendant may insist that they be purchased from the 
defendant, to be returned for study after wearing out or failing. 
While most products might be further improved by closely examining their actual 
operations and failures, this possibility could not account for a tie when returned items 
were not in fact studied or when service records were not written or collated to assist 
product design or manufacture. Perhaps the necessary costs of implementing those 
steps would themselves discourage attempts to disguise a tie with insincere 
examinations and studies. 
A product-improvement claim may be genuine and yet be attainable in a less 
restrictive way. When users are numerous, perhaps subjecting a sample (especially a 
large sample) of them to the tie is likely to provide all the data needed by a reasonable 
product improver. When users are not so numerous, an adequate sample would include 
a larger portion of them. Although collection of data from outside suppliers of the goods 
or services would be even less restrictive, that route is likely to be less flexible and more 
costly than subjecting an appropriate portion of the users to the tie. 
Asset Specificity and Quality Control as Defense 
A tie might be used by a defendant with no power in the tying market and with no 
purpose or effect of gaining power in the tied market or even of exploiting customers. 
While quality control certainly provides no ground for opposing tie-ins, let us assume a 
                                                          
3
 See Dan L. Burk & Brett H. McDonnell, Trademarks and the Boundaries of the Firm, 51 WM. & 
MARY L. REV. 345 (2009). 
8
Cf. Jefferson Parish Hosp. Dist. No. 2 v. Hyde, 466 U.S. 2 (1984) (hospital provided patients only 
with anesthesiologists it had selected). 
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tie that is prima facie unlawful on other grounds, and then consider when quality control 
should count toward its redemption. Of course, to the extent that any of the previous 
examples do not present two separate products, they would be untouched by anti-tying 
law and thus would require no defense for quality control or goodwill.
4
  Installation 
(especially when without extra charge) may seem inseparable from the machine itself, 
as might the spices creating the taste that defines a food trademark, or the bundle of 
services that constitute a hospital or arguably even the specialized combination of a 
complex machine plus servicing. Indeed, some decisions expressly declare that the 
justification for a business practice bears on whether to classify it as a tie.
9
 In Microsoft 
the D.C. Circuit appeared to reject this position, but did hold that the possibility of 
significant efficiencies justified applying the rule of reason rather than the per se rule to 
Microsoft's tie of its computer operating system and browser.
10
 
Finally, some variations negate prima facie illegality and thus dispense with any 
need for justification. For example, requiring one's customer to take a second product 
only from numerous “approved sources” in which the defendant has no economic 
interest falls outside the tying category altogether.
11
 
Problematically, many of the litigated ties have involved foreclosure of only a 
minuscule portion of the tied market. Requiring a significant foreclosure before finding 
prima facie illegality would often obviate the many vexing questions concerning either 
cost savings or quality control. Asset specificity is ubiquitous, and serves to explain ties 
in many competitive markets, including franchising, office equipment, and medical 
services to name a few.  A non-foreclosing tie ordinarily has no anticompetitive effects. 
Under a rule of reason treatment no justification would be required for legality, but even 
under harsher treatment even a modest inference of quality protection should defend 
the tie. 
In short, all the issues that must be separated for clear exposition are 
interconnected. The narrower the definition of a single product, the broader the concept 
of a tie-in; and the fewer the effects required for prima facie illegality, the greater is the 
warrant for allowing a quality control defense and for giving it wider scope. Put another 
way, when quality control is genuinely at stake, we should hesitate to require the 
defendant to take the less restrictive route of disclosing a trade secret (even with 
compensation) or possibly diluting its trademark,
12
 unless a serious foreclosure is also 
at stake. However, all those issues are reconnected later in the chapter. Here we 
                                                          
4
 On the requirement of separate products, see Ch. 17D-1. 
9
E.g., Hirsh v. Martindale-Hubbell, 674 F.2d 1343, 1347 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 459 U.S. 973 (1982). 
See also Jack Walters & Sons Corp. v. Morton Bldg., 737 F.2d 698, 703 (7th Cir. 1984) (single product if 
there are “rather obvious economies of joint provision”); see 10 ANTITRUST ¶¶ 1741–1745 (discussing 
this definition). 
10
Microsoft, 253 F.3d at 86–88; see Herbert Hovenkamp, IP Ties and Microsoft's Rule of Reason, 47 
ANTITRUST BULL. 369 (2002). 
11
See 9 ANTITRUST ¶ 1726. When the defendant collects a fee for approving a supplier, see 9 
ANTITRUST ¶ 1727d. 
12
E.g., Krehl v. Baskin-Robbins Ice Cream Company, 664 F.2d 1348 (9th Cir. 1982), where the 
franchisees wanted to substitute their own ice cream for Baskin-Robbins' trademarked brand. 
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assume prima facie illegality and ask whether and how a quality control defense should 
be analyzed. 
Protection of Quality and Goodwill 
Protecting quality and its attendant goodwill seems undeniably legitimate, as it 
benefits consumers as well as the producer. As usual, however, asserting a quality-
protection defense does not itself establish it, for the challenged tie may in fact serve a 
different function. Hence, the defendant must show how the tie actually promotes quality 
and protects goodwill. Even when the quality of the second product affects the 
functioning of the tying product. Users will also want to guard against malfunctions of 
the tying product. Users thus tend to choose qualified second products though they are 
not compelled by a tie-in to do so. In this sense, quality may be self-protecting, at least 
once the defendant has informed users of the necessary features. 
When quality does not thus protect itself, a customer's promise to use a second 
product that complies with specifications issued by the defendant is less restrictive than 
a promise to buy the product from the defendant. The discussion below examines the 
adequacy and administrative costs of implementing such compulsory specifications, 
which are generally lawful. 
When mere specifications, whether voluntary or compulsory, are ineffective or too 
costly, there remains another alternative to the conventional tie: allowing the customer 
to take the second product from anyone providing appropriate quality, as certified by the 
defendant. This “alternate source” option is genuine when the defendant appraises 
other products in good faith. The defendant may demand reimbursement for the costs of 
inspection. Under existing doctrines, however, it may not charge merely for access to 
the restrained customers or limit the number of approvals for its own sake.  When 
disclosure of specifications to customers or rivals involves significant trade secrets 
defendants should not be required to create new competition for a second product at all.  
Further, a defendant choosing to license its intellectual property may charge appropriate 
royalties. 
Many decisions, including several by the Supreme Court, have rejected quality-
control defenses because the challenged tie did not seem necessary to protect quality. 
In one of those cases, however, the Court spoke in terms that might seem to reject such 
a defense in principle even if a tie uniquely solved a genuine quality-control problem. In 
condemning a tie of punch cards under Clayton Act §3, notwithstanding a claim that thin 
and clean cards were necessary for effective operation of the defendant's tabulating 
machine, the Court made this apparently categorical statement: 
The Clayton Act names no exception to its prohibition of 
monopolistic tying clauses. Even if we are free to make an 
exception to its unambiguous command … we can perceive no 
tenable basis for an exception [where goodwill is either not at stake 
or is protectable in a less restrictive way].
13
 
                                                          
13
IBM Corp. v. United States, 298 U.S. 131, 140 (1936). 
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Notwithstanding the “no exception” and “unambiguous command” language, the holding 
was that IBM failed to establish a defense, even if one existed. At the ellipsis, moreover, 
the Court cited several lower court cases allowing tie-ins. 
In all events, the lower courts have consistently recognized the legitimacy of 
protecting quality. They have done so through several routes. Some weighed the 
business justification in the course of determining whether the challenged transaction 
involves two products or only one.
14
 Other courts explicitly absolved an otherwise illegal 
tie on the ground that it protected product quality. In addition, some courts recognize the 
legitimacy of quality control while holding that a particular defendant failed to show a 
significant quality problem in fact or that an adequate and less restrictive solution was 
available to the defendant. Finally, the D.C. Circuit held in Microsoft that product quality 
demands justified jettisoning the per se rule and applying a full rule of reason in the 
particular case of computer operating system/applications ties.
15
 
Quality Control Sufficiently Protected by Consumer Choice? 
Naturally, most buyers want the tying product to function well. IBM customers surely 
wanted accurate tabulating. Cable TV operators could not prosper without a properly 
installed system. Repeat patronage for auto dealers or fast-food franchisees would 
suffer when consumers receive poor repairs or food untrue to the trademark. And 
consumers surely want satisfactory anesthesia. 
Why then does the supplier of the tying product need to compel its customers to take 
a superior tied product instead of inferior (though less expensive)
16
 substitutes? 
Answering that question may vary with the tied buyer's knowledge of the products and 
the buyer's place in the distribution chain, as well as the life cycle and reputation of the 
tying product. 
Buyer Alone at Risk 
When the buyer alone bears the full consequences of diminished performance, it will 
presumably buy the second product with the best price-quality combination for its 
purposes. If such a buyer overweighs a bargain price for an unduly inferior product and 
reaps unhappy results, no one else can be harmed or blamed. Hence, in this situation, 
the seller's only interest, if any, is to inform the buyer of product characteristics—in the 
IBM example, the specifications for thin and clean cards that IBM machines can 
tabulate accurately.
17
 While IBM might exaggerate the quality difference between its 
cards and those of rivals, or the inaccuracies occasioned by thick or dirty cards might be 
                                                          
14
E.g., Jack Walters & Sons Corp. v. Morton Bldg., 737 F.2d 698 (7th Cir. 1984); Krehl v. Baskin-
Robbins Ice Cream Co., 664 F.2d 1348 (9th Cir. 1982). 
15
United States v. Microsoft Corp., 253 F.3d 34, 90 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 534 U.S. 952 (2001).  
16
The purchaser would seldom, if ever, buy an arguably inferior version of a product unless it were 
cheaper. To be sure, a physically inferior product is economically superior when its diminished-use value 
to the buyer is less than its price discount. 
17
The Supreme Court assumed that this was the situation and rejected quality-control justifications in 
IBM Corporation v. United States, 298 U.S. 131 (1936), and in International Salt Company v. United 
States, 332 U.S. 392 (1947). 
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acceptable to the user, the user that disregards IBM's advice has only itself to blame for 
any disappointing results. 
The defendant's stake in quality control is also minimal when it can readily be 
disclaimed. In Data General, for example, the defendant made computers and a 
software system that operated them.
18
 Not sold for use with other computers, the 
software could be obtained only by taking the defendant's computers. The court found a 
tie that was not adequately redeemed by the defendant's explanation that the software 
was designed to function solely with its own computers and could malfunction when 
used with at least some computers made by others (including the plaintiff). In that event, 
the defendant's warranty of properly functioning software would require unduly 
expensive field testing to identify the other computer's characteristic that caused the 
malfunction and to revise the software accordingly. To the court, those costs seemed 
self-inflicted, because the defendant might simply limit its warranty with respect to 
software used with other computers.
19
 
The Fourth Circuit replied similarly to Mercedes-Benz's fear that consumers or 
dealers might fraudulently claim warranty service on non-Mercedes parts that looked 
like the real thing.
20
 The court doubted that Mercedes would often be unable to identify 
its own allegedly superior parts and suggested that Mercedes could readily mark its own 
products to make them uniquely identifiable and thus escape fraudulent claims without 
requiring dealers to purchase all parts from Mercedes. 
Seller Also at Risk 
More is at stake when the seller also suffers from the buyer's erroneous choice of an 
unduly inferior version of the tied product. Suppose, for example, that the IBM tabulating 
machine had been a new product that had not yet established itself in the market. If too 
many buyers used inferior cards that they erroneously believed to be thin and clean 
enough, the machine might acquire a reputation for inaccuracy or quirkiness that would 
discourage use or even ruin the product. Moreover, users might be deceived by 
apparently trustworthy providers of supplies or services who blamed the machine. 
The Jerrold court saw just such a situation.
21
 Jerrold made devices for bringing in 
remote television broadcast signals to smaller towns that otherwise enjoyed no 
television stations or reception. At the outset, Jerrold sold the equipment outright to 
system operators, who arranged installation by Jerrold or others. Often organized with 
limited funds, some operators purchased the equipment on credit and chose cheaper 
but, as it turned out, inadequate installation from others. When such operators failed to 
                                                          
18
Data Gen. Corp. Antitrust Litig., 490 F. Supp. 1089 (N.D. Cal. 1980) (defense not established), 
ultimately condemned, 734 F.2d 1336 (9th Cir. 1984), cert. denied, 473 U.S. 908 (1985).   
19
Whether such a limit on a warranty might itself amount to a tie-in is explored in 10 ANTITRUST ¶¶ 
1740c5, 1744f, 1749d. 
20
Metrix Warehouse v. Daimler-Benz, 828 F.2d 1033 (4th Cir. 1987), cert. denied, 486 U.S. 1017 
(1988). 
21
United States v. Jerrold Elec. Corp., 187 F. Supp. 545, 556-557 (E.D. Pa. 1960), aff'd per curiam, 
365 U.S. 567 (1961); see also Queen City Pizza v. Domino's Pizza, 124 F.3d 430, 440–41 (3d Cir. 
1997) (noting in dicta that quality control may justify franchise ties). 
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prosper, Jerrold went unpaid
22
 and many observers doubted the quality of cable 
television systems, jeopardizing further sales by Jerrold. In response, Jerrold included 
installation in the sales price of its equipment and thus, in effect, required operators 
desiring the “tying” equipment to purchase “tied” installation service from Jerrold as well. 
Though legally free to purchase such service elsewhere, operators would naturally take 
the installation that was already “bundled” into the equipment price. 
The court held that Jerrold had presented a compelling defense that its survival—
indeed that of the new industry it had created—depended upon the tie-in, and that such 
alternatives as specifications and advice had already been proven inadequate. 
However, the court limited that defense to Jerrold's pioneering phase. As the cable TV 
concept and its implementing equipment were well established at the time of suit, the 
court held that Jerrold's reputation was no longer at stake. If new installations did not 
work properly, the market would understand that the failure lay with the installer rather 
than with Jerrold's equipment.
23
 
Free-rider Problems: Intermediate Buyer Transfers Risk of Poor Quality to Others 
The threat to the seller is even greater when the buyer is an intermediate party who 
gains immediately by paying less for any inferior product while suffering relatively little 
from the inferior performance. If even the best fast-food franchisee adjacent to a tourist 
attraction receives no repeat patronage—to take an extreme example—its business 
volume depends not on its own quality but on the goodwill generated by each tourist's 
hometown franchisee. That tourist area franchisee may increase profits by using inferior 
ingredients; it enjoys all the savings while fellow franchisees elsewhere bear all the loss 
in the product's reputation. Similarly, a gas station serving only transients might sell 
inferior accessories (such as oil) along with a well-known brand of gasoline that attracts 
the customers.
24
 
A more complex situation is the branded automobile dealer who repairs cars with 
parts made by a different manufacturer. For example, a Mercedes dealer uses 
cheaper—and, Mercedes would say, inferior—parts made by someone else. The dealer 
probably claims that the parts it uses are just as good or, perhaps, that any superiority 
of the auto maker's parts is superfluous “gold plating.” The manufacturer, on the other 
hand, claims that its repair parts are better and, in the case of luxury cars, that super-
perfection and reliability are not superfluous; they are the essence of the luxury 
                                                          
22
“Many operators were not in a position to pay cash for the necessary equipment and the risks were 
such that outside financing could not be obtained. Therefore, payment was often contingent on the 
success of the system.” Id. at 556. 
23
The court did not consider whether Jerrold, after it became well established, still bore severe risks 
on credit sales to operators who would be unable to pay if faulty installation impaired their success and 
revenues. 
24
For a more complex illustration of free riding that could interfere with quality, see 9 ANTITRUST ¶ 
1717f1 (hospital anesthesiologists). 
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product.
25
 Although consumer dissatisfaction impairs the product's reputation and the 
repeat business of both dealer and manufacturer, the manufacturer's long-term stake in 
product goodwill is greater, and the dealer may have some transient victims who would 
not return for repairs or new cars in any event. 
Pioneering Versus Established Products 
The Mercedes example takes us back to Jerrold and its distinction between 
pioneering and well-established products. That case permitted installation service to be 
tied to rural cable TV systems only until Jerrold had proven that its product worked well. 
The court recognized that it could not identify the day or year when the defense 
expired
26
 and thus highlighted the uncertain boundary between a well-established 
product of secure repute and a pioneering product not yet widely accepted as reliable. 
But is a reputation ever that secure? Though Mercedes is well established and 
apparently successful, every inferior repair part used by a dealer can lose future sales 
to the immediate customer and perhaps her acquaintances as well. Strong positions are 
not impregnable, especially in luxury products. 
At most, therefore, the pioneering-established distinction seems appropriate only 
when the manufacturer's customer would itself suffer the primary loss from using an 
inferior substitute for the tied product. In Jerrold the cable operator itself would suffer 
greatly, if not fatally, from improper installation. In the Mercedes example, some dealers 
might think they would not be injured significantly by using moderately inferior repair 
parts. If so and if the product then works less well for the consumer, the product's 
reputation tends to erode—perhaps slowly but probably cumulatively. Because this 
seems the typical, not the extraordinary, consequence of inferior repair service, the 
manufacturer's interest in proper repairs seems legitimate and forceful—more so in the 
case of pioneering products, but not exclusively there. Whether a tie-in is needed for 
that purpose is the next question. 
Published or Other Manufacturer Supplied Specifications as an Alternative 
Assuming that a second product's quality significantly affects that of a first product 
and the defendant's goodwill, as in the previous examples, is the defendant able to 
ensure proper quality control by its customer without a tie requiring the customer to buy 
the second item from the same source? The least restrictive route is education via 
published specifications for the second product. The defendant might simply publish the 
specifications of the second product: the thickness and cleanliness of the punch cards, 
the repair parts, detailed installation and service manuals, the flavorings and ingredients 
of a fast food, or even “how to identify a good anesthesiologist.” Such specifications 
may thus appear to be less restrictive alternatives to tie-ins. 
Of course, no alternative would be less restrictive if the defendant successfully 
                                                          
25
Of course, either the dealer or the manufacturer might be “exploiting” consumers—dealers by 
pocketing the savings from using alternative parts, or manufacturers by attempting to force unnecessarily 
high-priced parts on dealers and consumers. 
26
Jerrold, 187 F. Supp. at 558. 
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shows that mechanically necessary equipment of like quality and design are not 
available from any other source.
27
 However, “Once there is a competitor who can supply 
the tied items in the same quality class as the original vendor, the justification of a tying 
arrangement to protect the industry name evaporates.”
28
 The quoted statement 
assumes, of course, that the alternatives of requiring specifications or approvals of other 
sources can adequately protect quality. While such alternatives are equally adequate—
and the tie equally superfluous—before any equivalent supplier arrives, the alternatives 
are no less exclusionary than a tie when no one else can meet specifications or gain 
approval. In that event, neither customers nor would-be rivals are injured, even though 
society might prefer the alternatives as more hospitable to equivalent suppliers if and 
when they arrive. 
The Supreme Court certainly thought so in the International Salt case.
29
 International 
Salt had provided food canners with a patented machine to dispense measured 
amounts of salt into cans moving along a production line. Customers were allowed to 
use the machine only with salt purchased from International, which explained that its 
98.2 percent pure salt assured proper functioning of the machine and minimized repairs 
for which it was responsible. Rival salt was allegedly less consistent and “in many 
instances” was only 95 percent pure.
30
 Assuming arguendo that the machines worked 
best with salt of 98.2 percent purity, the Court said that canners might be required to 
use only salt meeting such a specification of quality. “But it is not pleaded, nor is it 
argued, that the machine is allergic to salt of equal quality produced by anyone except 
International.”
31
 Moreover, quality control did not seem to be the true function of the tie, 
for the defendant did not specify the source or quality of salt used with the machine in 
regions where it sold no salt.
32
 
The Court had taken the same approach in its earlier IBM decision: even if IBM's 
tabulating machines might malfunction without clean and thin cards, “There is no 
contention that others … cannot meet these requirements. It affirmatively appears, by 
stipulation, that others are capable of manufacturing [suitable] cards.”
33
 
As the Supreme Court summed up in Jefferson Parish, 
We have … uniformly rejected … goodwill defenses for tying 
                                                          
27
See United States v. Mercedes-Benz of N. Am., 517 F. Supp. 1369, 1388 (N.D. Cal. 1981) (rejecting 
defendant's argument that use of unauthorized parts would lead to customer dissatisfaction and dangerous 
safety problems leading to massive tort exposure; court: “if a manufacturer's brand of the tied product is 
in fact superior to that of competitors, the buyer will presumably choose it anyway.”). In United States v. 
Microsoft Corporation, 253 F.3d 34, 90–91 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 534 U.S. 952 (2001), the problem as 
Microsoft stated it was not so much the quality of alternative browsers but the uniqueness of their 
application program interfaces (API's), or interfaces that computer software developers need for their 
software to invoke the Internet or collateral capabilities. 
28
Carpa v. Ward Foods, 536 F.2d 39, 47 (5th Cir. 1976). 
29
Int’l Salt Co. v. United States, 332 U.S. 392 (1947). 
30
Id. at 397. 
31
Id. at 397-398. 
32
See John L. Peterman, The International Salt Case, 22 J.L. & ECON. 351, 360 (1979). 
33
IBM Corp. v. United States, 298 U.S. 131, 139 (1936). 
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arrangements, finding that the use of contractual quality 
specifications are generally sufficient to protect quality without the 
use of a tying arrangement.
34
 
The Court did not have to face the quality issue in that case because there were no 
findings below “as to why contractual quality specifications would not protect the [tying 
defendant].”
35
 Further, the Court was not stating this conclusion as a matter of law, for 
clearly the sufficiency of quality specifications in a particular instance presents a 
question of fact. The Court was saying only that this particular goodwill defense was 
seldom or never recognized in the historical cases. 
Accordingly, defendants offering a quality-control defense have been required to 
rebut the adequacy of specifications as a less restrictive protection of quality by showing 
that specifications cannot be reasonably articulated or that monitoring and enforcement 
of compulsory specifications are too costly or are ineffective. Disclosure may also have 
the effect of surrendering trade secrets without compensation. 
In any event, requiring courts to evaluate claims or defenses about the adequacy of 
a rival’s alternative to the tied goods, such as aftermarket parts, places upon them a 
substantial burden.  Often these arrangements are worked out among firms after many 
years of trial and error, and courts cannot possibly substitute their judgment effectively 
for those of the parties themselves.   As we have noted previously, this makes it 
imperative that the judicial obligation arise only when a tie is clearly exclusionary on 
other grounds, and not simply prima facie illegal under a rule that does not insist on real 
proof of anticompetitive foreclosure. 
Adequate Articulation 
It is not always possible to articulate specifications that capture the essence of 
product quality or that can be understood and applied by immediate or ultimate users. 
Accordingly, the courts have consistently declared that the alternative is not required 
where mandatory specifications for a substitute would have to be so complex and 
detailed that they could not practicably be supplied or administered.
36
 Installation of a 
complex product, especially if new, illustrates the point, for a manual could be complete 
enough only with actual training and supervision. More clearly, specifications are 
impractical when the requisite quality depends on the franchisor's taste, which cannot 
readily be expressed in a formula or recipe. Thus, a coffee supplier was allowed to 
require restaurant franchisees bearing its name to buy its ground coffee, which was 
blended according to its taste, and the goods the supplier baked itself, but not goods 
                                                          
34
Jefferson Parish Hosp. Dist. No. 2 v. Hyde, 466 U.S. 2, 26 n.42 (1984) (citing International Salt, 
IBM, and dicta in Standard Oil Co. v. United States, 337 U.S. 293, 305-306 (1949) (“The only situation 
… in which the protection of good will may necessitate the use of tying clauses is where specifications for 
a substitute would be so detailed that they could not practicably be supplied.”). 
35
Jefferson Parish, 466 U.S. at 26 n.46. 
36
See, e.g., Susser v. Carvel, 332 F.2d 505, 515 (2d Cir. 1964), cert. dismissed, 381 U.S. 125 (1965) 
(providing detailed specifications for ice cream flavors in advance would be very difficult); see also 
United States v. Mercedes-Benz of N. Am., 517 F. Supp. 1369, 1388 (N.D. Cal. 1981). 
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that were produced by licensees.
37
 
By this reasoning, a soft-ice cream franchisor was denied this defense when it failed 
to show that specifications would have to be so complex and detailed as to make them 
impractical.
38
 Other franchisors were also denied the defense after a jury concluded that 
their goodwill interest in uniformly tasting chicken or seafood dinners made by 
franchisees could be satisfied without a tie of flavorings or other ingredients.
39
 Similarly, 
an automobile distributor was preliminarily denied a defense for requiring dealers buying 
its cars to take delivery service arranged by the distributor.
40
 Although timely delivery 
was needed to please consumers, the court supposed that many carriers could supply 
that service once the defendant specified delivery requirements. On the same grounds, 
a cemetery was not allowed to insist that those buying its burial lots also take its grave 
markers.
41
 Although the cemetery's responsibility for perpetual care established a 
legitimate interest in attractive and durable markers, many markers made by others 
could satisfy any reasonable specifications for those ends, and the cemetery could 
exclude those that did not. While specifications for “foundation preparation and 
memorial placement” might have been harder to frame, a similarly situated defendant 
was unable to persuade the court that “the system of competition will become 
unmanageable and that the foundations prepared or markers installed by their private 
competitors will detract from the appearance or decrease the general services rendered 
the public.”
42
 Specifications were not shown to be impractical.
43
 
The adequacy of a less restrictive alternative has often been left to the jury.
44
 But 
where experience actually demonstrates the inadequacy of advice (and apparently of 
compulsory specifications), summary judgment or a directed verdict for the defendant 
                                                          
37
Chock Full O'Nuts Corp., 83 F.T.C. 575, 643–56 (1973). 
38
Susser, 332 F.2d at 515 (judgment for defendant on other grounds); see also Thompson v. Metro. 
Multi-List, 934 F.2d 1566 (11th Cir. 1991), cert. denied, 506 U.S. 903 (1992). The alleged tying product 
was a real estate board's multiple listing service by which properties listed with one broker can be sold by 
any participating broker, thus making a property available to the customers of many brokers. To obtain 
the alleged tying product (multi-list service), brokers were obliged to join the real estate board (alleged 
tied product). The board defended the membership requirement as a reasonable way to compel brokers 
using the multi-list service to abide by the board's solicitation and arbitration rules assuring the integrity 
of the tying product. The court replied that the participants in the multi-list service could be made to 
promise to abide by such rules without requiring them to join the board. 
39
Siegel v. Chicken Delight, 448 F.2d 43 (9th Cir. 1971), cert. denied, 405 U.S. 955 (1972); Carpa
 
v. 
Ward Foods, 536 F.2d 39 (5th Cir. 1976) (seafood products conventionally classified by grade, which 
franchisor could specify). 
40
Anderson Foreign Motors v. New England Toyota Distrib., 475 F. Supp. 973 (D. Mass. 1979). 
41
Moore v. Jas. H. Matthews & Co., 550 F.2d 1207 (9th Cir. 1977). 
42
Rosebrough Monument Co. v. Memorial Park Cemetery Assn., 666 F.2d 1130, 1146 (8th Cir. 
1981), cert. denied, 457 U.S. 1111 (1982). 
43
Ibid; Moore, supra note 41, at 1217. 
44
E.g., Siegel v. Chicken Delight, 448 F.2d 43 (9th Cir. 1971), cert. denied, 405 U.S. 955 (1972); 
Warriner Hermetics v. Copeland Refrigeration, 463 F.2d 1002 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 409 U.S. 1086 
(1972) (franchised wholesalers allowed to buy rebuilt compressors only from manufacturer-authorized 
rebuilders who use manufacturer's parts exclusively); Metrix
 
Warehouse v. Daimler-Benz, 828 F.2d 1033 
(4th Cir. 1987), cert. denied, 486 U.S. 1017 (1988). 
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has been granted, as in the First Circuit decision allowing a manufacturer of silo 
unloaders to sell them only to those owning the manufacturer's silo.
45
 Of the 36 
unloaders previously sold to owners of other silos, complaints and claims were made on 
half, and six were returned for refund. The court concluded, “A record of fifty percent 
dissatisfied customers over a seven-year period [is] a matter too substantial to be 
disregarded…. Antitrust laws do not require a business to cut its own throat.”
46
 
Of course, specifications are not an effective alternative when a uniform brand name 
on the second product is the essence of the arrangement. For example, a McDonald's 
franchisee argued that in order to obtain the tying franchise, the franchisee was obliged 
to serve Coca-Cola and no other cola drink.
47
 The court assumed that a tie-in was 
present but nevertheless gave summary judgment for McDonald's because a uniform, 
standardized menu was at the heart of the fast-food franchise business model. 
Even more clearly, the manufacturer of a brand-name product is entitled to insist that 
dealers resell only that product under that brand name; dealers may not offer under that 
name products of equivalent specifications, for the brand name here identifies the 
manufacturer.
5
 Indeed, the courts uniformly decline to characterize this arrangement as 
a tie at all.
48
 
Voluntary Versus Compulsory Compliance 
Specifications are most likely to suffice in precisely those situations where 
compliance matters least to the tying seller. When the customer bears virtually all the 
risk of malfunctions, her own interest will force her to pay attention to the specifications. 
If she does not, the maker of the machine can be relatively indifferent. 
However, even the most precise voluntary specifications do not bind the 
intermediate customer or diminish its incentives to buy an inferior second product, 
                                                          
45
Dehydrating Process Co. v. A.O. Smith Corp., 292 F.2d 653 (1st Cir.), cert. denied, 368 U.S. 931 
(1961). 
46
Id. at 656–57. 
47
Martino v. McDonald's Sys., 625 F. Supp. 356 (N.D. Ill. 1985). Interestingly, the franchisor had no 
direct financial interest in the Coca-Cola company's sales. However, that company contributed to the 
franchisees' advertising fund, which was controlled by the franchisor, according to the plaintiff. For the 
relevance of a “tying” seller's financial interest in the “tied” product, see 9 ANTITRUST ¶¶ 1726–1727.  
5
 See J. THOMAS MCCARTHY, 2 MCCARTHY ON TRADEMARKS AND UNFAIR COMPETITION §18:2 (4th 
ed. 1996) (“Good will and its trademark symbol are as inseparable as Siamese Twins who cannot be 
separated without death to both.”). 
48
E.g., Krehl v. Baskin-Robbins Ice Cream Company, 664 F.2d 1348 (9th Cir. 1982); Jack Walters & 
Sons Corp. v. Morton Bldg., 737 F.2d 698 (7th Cir. 1984); California Glazed Prods. v. Burns & Russel 
Co., 708 F.2d 1423(9th Cir.), cert. denied, 464 U.S. 938 (1983); Redd v. Shell Oil Co., 524 F.2d 1054 
(10th Cir. 1975), cert. denied, 425 U.S. 912 (1976). 
Trademark law condemns many attempts to disaggregate a trademark from the good to which it is 
attached. In general, the owner of a trademark is obliged to stand behind the trademarked product. Thus, 
the law frowns on, although does not entirely eliminate, the “in gross” assignment of trademarks. See 
HERBERT HOVENKAMP, MARK D. JANIS, MARK A. LEMLEY, & CHRISTOPHER R. LESLIE, IP AND 
ANTITRUST: AN ANALYSIS OF ANTITRUST PRINCIPLES APPLIED TO INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY LAW §2.4 
(2d ed. 2009 & Supp.). 
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particularly where free riding on other dealers is a valuable possibility.
49
 The 
manufacturer and consumer are at risk precisely because the intermediary may foolishly 
or selfishly forgo a superior second product. Voluntary specifications obviously do not 
compel the intermediary to make a different choice, although they might sometimes 
educate that firm to make a better choice. 
Moreover, specifications would only rarely educate consumers to the point of 
dissuading them from accepting an incorrectly flavored hamburger, a non-Mercedes 
replacement part, repair service not in accord with the manufacturer's manual, or a less 
qualified anesthesiologist. The consumer will not be in position to observe whether the 
franchisee followed the recipe, nor to understand the specifications governing auto 
parts, service procedures, or anesthesiology or its practitioners. 
When voluntary specifications do not adequately serve the tying seller's legitimate 
interests, the defendant is free to require compliance. IBM is entitled to insist that 
machine users promise to process only cards meeting its specifications, or the hospital 
may allow only approved anesthesiologists. Mercedes or fast food franchisors might 
require their customers to promise to use only parts or recipes meeting the 
specifications. Jerrold might sell only to cable operators promising to engage installers 
following the Jerrold manual.
50
 The International Salt Court itself approved of 
“reasonable restrictions designed in good faith to minimize maintenance burdens and to 
assure satisfactory operation.”
51
 
Cost and Effectiveness 
An immediate customer's promise to comply adds nothing to voluntary specifications 
unless the promisee can monitor compliance effectively and economically. In general, 
administering compulsory specifications is more burdensome than administering a tie. 
When a second product (or service) is bundled into the purchase price of a first 
product, the customer naturally accepts the second product from the tying seller rather 
than pay additional sums to another supplier. Because the costs of administering a 
bundled tie are zero, administering any alternative inevitably costs more, probably 
substantially more. While supervising another's installation would be very costly, 
examining the results would be cheaper but insufficient to correct faulty installation 
without costly troubleshooting. 
When not bundled into the price of the tying product, a tie has administrative costs of 
its own, because the customer may “cheat” on a promise to buy the tied product only 
from the tying seller. However, the seller need only observe a single instance of 
noncompliance to detect the customer's breach. By contrast, each of the customer's 
purchases from other sources must be tested to determine whether the customer has 
followed promised specifications. 
                                                          
49
A clear example is the franchisee without significant repeat business, who employs inferior goods 
because customers rely on the reputation of the franchise as a whole. 
50
During the pioneering stage, however, Jerrold's unwritten experience may be the key to successful 
installation. 
51
Int’l Salt Co. v. United States, 332 U.S. 392, 397 (1947). 
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Consider, for example, a manufacturer who leases a machine or guarantees its 
performance. When the manufacturer itself provides the machine's supplies, 
attachments, or services, it remains responsible under any machine warranty and 
cannot assess the user for deterioration of a leased machine. Otherwise, the 
manufacturer must determine whether the machine's failure or deterioration was caused 
by the machine's own defects or by inferior supplies, attachments, or service. Even if 
such inferiority leaves a readily observable residue, it may be costly to discover it; 
without that residue, it will be very costly or impossible to learn whether the user fulfilled 
its promise to use materials or service of specified quality. 
Such difficulties multiply for food franchisors or automobile manufacturers. They 
cannot rely on consumer complaints of inconsistent taste or inferior repair parts, for 
consumers may simply buy their next sandwich or auto elsewhere rather than bother to 
document their dissatisfaction in a brief to the franchisor or manufacturer. Even after 
complaints, investigations are expensive. So are unannounced inspections, which may 
also be inconclusive to prove substantial breach rather than an occasional lapse. 
Inspecting the franchisee's kitchen may find the spices being used, although chemical 
analysis might be needed to determine their composition. Similarly, the auto dealer's 
repair parts may require complex testing as well as some way to assess a dealer's claim 
that such parts (if inferior) were demanded by an economizing consumer. Though not 
insurmountable, such difficulties often mean that the specification alternative is more 
costly and less effective than a tie to implement a supplier's legitimate interest in quality 
control. 
Conventional skepticism toward the need for a tie to protect quality was expressed 
by the Fourth Circuit in denying Mercedes, which had required dealers to use its own 
repair parts, a directed verdict or judgment notwithstanding the verdict.
52
 The jury was 
allowed to conclude that Mercedes could have assured consumers proper repair parts 
by requiring dealers to conform to Mercedes specifications and to inform consumers of 
the source of repair parts that would be installed if consumers did not specifically 
request Mercedes parts. However, when a jury rejected the alternatives, the Ninth 
Circuit affirmed judgment for Mercedes.
53
 That court was persuaded by Mercedes that 
franchised dealers may be tempted to “cut corners” with lower quality repair parts and 
that it would be burdensome for Mercedes to police each franchisee's compliance with 
contract specifications on each repair part. Moreover, even if dealers wanted to comply, 
they could hardly replicate Mercedes' own rigorous testing.
54
 
Without Mercedes' reputation for rigorous quality, General Motors' similar claim had 
                                                          
52
Metrix
 
Warehouse v. Daimler-Benz, 828 F.2d 1033 (4th Cir. 1987), cert. denied, 486 U.S. 1017 
(1988). 
53
Mozart Co. v. Mercedes-Benz of N. Am., 833 F.2d 1342 (9th Cir. 1987), cert. denied, 488 U.S. 870 
(1988). 
54
See also Teleflex Indus. Prods. v. Brunswick Corp., 293 F. Supp. 106 (E.D. Pa. 1968), rev'd on 
other grounds, 410 F.2d 380 (3d Cir. 1969), which denied a preliminary injunction against a defendant 
who could probably defend sale of boat engines coupled with instrument panel controls on the ground that 
effective engine operation depended on properly functioning instruments and that malfunctioning would 
ultimately damage the engine, for which consumers would blame the defendant. 
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been rejected by the Federal Trade Commission in 1941.
55
 To the FTC, the restraint 
seemed too broad in that it embraced parts and accessories whose alleged inferiority 
would not affect operation of the automobile, GM's warranty obligation, or its goodwill. 
Moreover, the materials and construction of a large number of the parts made by others 
were identical to those made by GM. Because that also seemed to be the case for 
grave markers, a cemetery was not allowed to insist upon supplying all the markers of 
its graves, although it was responsible for perpetual care.
56
 For the same reason, the 
Ninth Circuit required a trial for a defendant to show that rivals' seeds were actually 
inferior to its own.
57
 
Finally, quality specifications may not work at all when the quality can be attained 
only when the “tying” and “tied” goods are assembled as a unit by the defendant itself. 
For example, in Microsoft
58
 the defendant was accused of tying its Internet Explorer (IE) 
Web browser to the Windows operating system by commingling the codes of the two 
programs so that the IE code could not be removed from the operating system code 
without causing the latter to fail. In this case Microsoft argued that it was not merely the 
“quality” of the IE browser that was at stake; but also the fact that bundling IE code into 
the operating system made it easier for third-party software producers to make 
programs that invoked the Internet as part of their operations. Without passing judgment 
on the merits of this claim, the court noted that it was “unclear” how the same benefits 
could be achieved via quality specifications.
59
 As a result, the court concluded the tie in 
question should be evaluated under a full rule of reason.
60
 
Required Use of Approved Providers 
Instead of relying on general specifications that might compromise trade secrets and 
resist effective monitoring, a defendant might insist that users of the tying product take 
the second product from “approved sources” (including itself). 
To put this discussion in context, note the three ways in which approval of alternative 
suppliers may be legally relevant. (1) To the extent that customers are able to buy the 
second product elsewhere, they are not prevented from dealing with competitors of the 
restraining supplier and therefore do not fall within the literal language of Clayton Act §3 
and may therefore not appear subject to a tie-in at all.
62
 (2) To the extent that customers 
                                                          
55
Pick Mfg. Co. v. Gen. Motors, 80 F.2d 641 (7th Cir. 1935), aff’d per curiam, 299 U.S. 3 (1936).  An 
earlier Seventh Circuit decision favored GM on the ground of inadequate anticompetitive effect and was 
affirmed per curiam by the Supreme Court as not clearly erroneous. See Pick, 80 F.2d 641. 
56
Moore v. Jas. H. Matthews & Co., 550 F.2d 1207 (9th Cir. 1977). 
57
Betaseed v. U and I, 681 F.2d 1203 (9th Cir. 1982). 
58
See United States v. Microsoft Corp., 253 F.3d 34, 90 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 534 U.S. 952 (2001). 
59
Microsoft, 253 F.3d at 90. 
60
Ibid. 
62
See, e.g., Kentucky Fried Chicken Corp v. Diversified Packaging Corp., 549 F.2d 368, 378–79 (5th 
Cir. 1977) (requiring restaurant franchisees to purchase food cartons only from ten approved sources, one 
of which was an affiliate of the franchisor, not a tie because franchisee “not required to buy a single unit 
of the tied product from the tying party”); Gen. Motors Corp. v. Gibson Chem. & Oil Corp., 661 F. Supp. 
567, 570–71 (E.D.N.Y. 1987) (no tie where GM allegedly required auto purchasers to use Dexron 
transmission fluid but licensed all qualified suppliers without charge to use that trademark); Miller v. Int’l 
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can buy the second product elsewhere, there is little danger that the restraining supplier 
can acquire power in the second market not based on customer preference for its 
product(and no danger when the defendant does not supply the second product at all). 
Hence, even the low threshold for illegal effects may not be satisfied here.
63
 (3) 
Assuming that a tie-in is present and prima facie illegal but that defendant has a 
genuine quality-control problem, is approval of other sources for the second product a 
reasonable and preferable way of solving that problem? Only the third issue is 
considered here. 
Approving alternative sources may benefit customers, society, and the tying seller. 
As compared with tying as a vehicle for quality control, approval allows the restrained 
customer some choice among suppliers of the second product and thereby reduces the 
restraint's ability to bring market power to the restraining seller. As compared with 
voluntary or mandatory specifications, insisting on approved sources can protect quality 
better while reducing both costs of administration and compromises of trade secrets. 
Trade secrets are less at risk because they would be disclosed only to the relatively 
few firms making the second product rather than to the numerous franchisees or 
customers using the product. To be sure, every additional disclosure makes a secret 
less secure, and it is hard to imagine any anti-tying rule that would require, say, Coca 
Cola to disclose its formula to anyone. With formulas less secret to begin with, limiting 
disclosure to spice packagers who covenant against further disclosure may suffice to 
protect a fast-food recipe that is neither very distinctive in fact nor resistant to “reverse 
engineering.” 
Approval, moreover, need not rest on any disclosure at all. For example, Mercedes 
can examine parts made by others, rejecting some and approving others, without 
disclosing its own manufacturing techniques, materials, or designs—leaving rivals to 
discover these matters if they can. The question is whether we can identify sham 
disapprovals in the absence of objective specifications. 
Quite apart from the trade-secret problem, insisting that customers use approved 
sources may protect quality better and at lower cost that monitoring each user's 
compliance with specifications. The defendant need only discover that the franchisor, 
dealer, or other customer has patronized an unapproved source rather than examine 
each product used in order to detect more-than-occasional or minor departures from 
specifications. In approving alternative sources, moreover, the defendant implements its 
own specifications and chooses the tolerable degree of noncompliance—a task for 
which it is probably better qualified than its customer. The other side of the competence 
coin, however, is sham disapproval, to which we now turn. 
Adequacy and Good Faith Implementation 
Notwithstanding its many attractions, approval of alternative sources may be too 
burdensome to require. The Ninth Circuit affirmed a jury verdict in favor of Mercedes' 
                                                                                                                                                                                           
Dairy Queen, 1979-1 Trade Cas. ¶62,593 (D. Minn.) (no tie where franchisor authorized over 100 
suppliers nationally and was ready to designate more). 
63
See 9 ANTITRUST ¶ 1726. 
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requirement that its franchised dealers use its repair parts even though it might instead 
have furnished other suppliers with design specifications for those products.
64
 Mercedes 
would presumably have to test the products of other suppliers in the same rigorous way 
it tests its own products. “Designating particular suppliers … requires policing 
compliance at the manufacturer level, which may be just as difficult as at the franchisee 
level.”
65
 
On the other hand, a hospital's screening of physicians seemed an adequate means 
of protecting quality. In Jefferson Parish, a hospital staffed its operating rooms 
exclusively with a certain group of anesthesiologists, explaining that patients benefitted 
by the exclusion of incompetent doctors.
66
 Regarding this arrangement as a tie of 
anesthesiologists to operating rooms, the court held the tie unnecessary. The hospital 
could take the less restrictive course of screening anesthesiologists and allowing only 
the competent ones to practice at the hospital. The hospital had apparently not proved 
that such an alternative method of screening was significantly less effective or more 
costly. 
When approvals are practicable in principle, the defendant still cannot be faulted for 
the mere absence of numerous (or even any) such approvals.
67
 Customers or rivals 
may not have sought approvals, or no rival product may be good enough. On the other 
hand, an approved-supplier option for customers might be entirely fictitious. 
In any event, the test of an approved-source option is not the existence or number of 
current approvals but the defendant's readiness in good faith to examine rival products 
and to approve the qualified ones.
68
 Courts have approved contractual restrictions 
                                                          
64
Mozart Co. v. Mercedes-Benz of N. Am., 833 F.2d 1342 (9th Cir. 1987), cert. denied, 488 U.S. 870 
(1988). 
65
Id. at 1342. In an earlier suit by the government, Mercedes was denied summary judgment because 
it had not proven that other manufacturers did not supply parts of equivalent quality or that it could not 
practicably and rigorously inspect rival products. United States v. Mercedes-Benz of N. Am., 517 F. 
Supp. 1369 (N.D. Cal. 1981). That suit was ultimately dismissed by the government. 547 F. Supp. 399 
(N.D. Cal. 1982); see also Metrix
 
Warehouse v. Daimler-Benz, 828 F.2d 1033 (4th Cir. 1987), cert. 
denied, 486 U.S. 1017 (1988). 
66
Hyde v. Jefferson Parish Hosp. Dist. No. 2, 686 F.2d 286 (5th Cir. 1982), rev'd on other grounds, 
466 U.S. 2 (1984). 
67
In Polytechnic Data Corportation v. Xerox Corporation, 362 F. Supp. 1, 8 (N.D. Ill. 1973), a 
machine lease forbade attachments not tested and listed by Underwriter's Labs. Xerox demonstrated good 
faith by providing an interface for attachments made by others. Although that interface was the only one 
approved by UL, according to the plaintiff, the requirements were exactly what various local governments 
had placed into electrical codes, and the plaintiff did not accept the opportunity to conform. A tie-in had 
not been adequately pleaded, and “[i]t is clear … that there is no antitrust violation in adopting and 
implementing a policy which is designed to promote safety, protect the integrity of one's property or 
goodwill or assure proper functioning of equipment.” 
68
See Photovest Corp. v. Fotomat Corp., 606 F.2d 704 (7th Cir. 1979), cert. denied, 445 U.S. 917 
(1980). At one time, the defendant Fotomat required its franchisees to purchase their photo-processing 
services from the defendant or from approved sources in which the defendant had no financial interest. 
Although the defendant provided no list of approved processors, the court found no tie-in: “Given the 
contractual language, which at least provides for the possibility of purchasing processing from non-
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limiting customers to approved sources when approval is not “unjustifiably withheld”
69
 or 
when the contract forbids the franchisor from “unreasonably withholding” approval.
70
 Of 
course, it will sometimes be difficult to distinguish good faith from subterfuge.
71
 
Inspection Fees 
The defendant may require reimbursement from customers or rivals for its 
reasonable costs of inspecting and later reinspecting the rival product. Reasonable 
inspection fees are permissible because no one should be forced to perform services 
for another without compensation for the property, energy, time, or other resources 
thereby consumed. Let us consider whether this axiom is overcome by one practical or 
one conceptual argument. 
First is the practical assertion that allowing the fee would burden access to 
equivalent products more than disallowance would burden defendants. It seems 
undeniable that allowing inspection fees creates an opportunity to delay inspection 
through negotiation or to demand excessive fees that make the approved-supplier 
option a charade. Hence, allowing such charges will burden access. Were inspection 
costs de minimis, judicial convenience might warrant imposing them upon the defendant 
to induce defendants to think twice before imposing any restraint and to save plaintiffs 
and antitrust tribunals the burden of distinguishing reasonable fees from de facto refusal 
to approve others. However, inspection costs will not always be so minor. 
Second is the conceptual argument that disallowing inspection fees does not 
expropriate defendant's resources on behalf of customers or rivals because inspecting a 
rival product's quality is seen primarily to serve the defendant itself. After all, the 
rationale for allowing any defense for quality control is that the restraint serves the 
defendant's legitimate interest in maintaining the quality and goodwill of its tying 
product. While inspecting rival products may not be the defendant's preferred method of 
assuring the reputation of its tying product, such assurance undoubtedly serves the 
defendant's own interests. 
Although this is true, an overly aggressive anti-tying law is what often coerces the 
use of an approved-source option. The issue arises only after the defendant establishes 
a prima facie justification that the challenged tie effectively promotes product quality. In 
rebuttal, it is the plaintiff who insists that approved sources would protect quality as well 
and less restrictively. To accept that rebuttal, the tribunal must conclude that the 
                                                                                                                                                                                           
Fotomat sources, we are reluctant to find a tying arrangement without some evidence that Fotomat 
applied the contract language so restrictively as to constitute a de facto tying clause.” Id. at 722. 
69
Smith v. Denny's Rest., 62 F.R.D. 459 (N.D. Cal. 1974) (no tie unless approval “unjustifiably 
withheld”). 
70
Kentucky Fried Chicken Corp. v. Diversified Packaging Corp., 549 F.2d 368, 378 (5th Cir. 1977) 
(no tie). 
71
For example, in Ohio-Sealy Mattress Manufacturing Company v. Sealy, 585 F.2d 821, 836 (7th Cir. 
1978), cert. denied, 440 U.S. 930 (1979), the court gave relatively little weight to contractual provisions 
for approval of other suppliers and the absence of evidence that the defendant had ever denied any 
approval. The only approved firms were the defendant's subsidiaries and two other firms that, the jury 
might find, had paid commissions to the defendant for the privilege of being approved. 
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proposed alternative restrains competition much less, protects quality as well, and does 
not burden the defendant with significant costs. 
If such costs are significant, we would not impose them on the defendant merely 
because the alternative restraint protects the quality of its tying product. Threatened 
with “Your money or your life,” handing over one's wallet serves one's own interest. 
Somewhat similar is the defendant who is told “to inspect rival products without charge 
or give up the goodwill you have in the tying product.” That the defendant would rather 
do the former than the latter does not warrant imposing those costs upon it. 
Of course, permitting such charges creates an opportunity for abuse. Unduly high 
fees, unnecessarily intensive inspection, or too frequent re-inspections could be so 
burdensome as to discourage any requests or make any approved rivals 
noncompetitive. Actual costs (including the opportunity costs of any resources involved) 
are the appropriate measure, and the defendant should bear the burden of proving 
these costs. 
Access Fee72 
May the defendant charge other suppliers of the tied product a fee for the privilege of 
access to the tied customers without losing a prima facie quality-control justification that 
it might otherwise have? A negative answer is the simplest and the one most consistent 
with the cases applying present doctrine. First, once a restraint is declared per se or 
prima facie illegal, with quality control seen as an affirmative justification, the scope of 
the justification limits the permissible restraint. Obviously, the restraint with an approval 
fee goes beyond that justification, and the finding of prima facie analysis amounts to a 
holding that the defendant has no general entitlement to restrict its customers' access to 
rival suppliers and thus has no entitlement to sell them access to the tied customers. 
Second, though an approval fee can protect quality while generating incremental profit, 
it might provide an independent motive for the defendant's tie and thus undermine the 
defendant's sincerity in claiming that it protects quality better than non-tying alternatives. 
Hence, administrative convenience in supervising litigation reinforces the first reason for 
rejecting a quality-control defense when the defendant charges merely for access to the 
tied customers. 
The Seventh Circuit thought it was confronted with such a fee and rejected it.
73
 The 
defendant controlling the Sealy mattress trademark required licensees making 
mattresses to use a “Posturegrid” element, which is a patented product of Universal 
Wire, which “paid to Sealy a charge of from three to five percent of their sales to the 
licensees, unbeknownst to the licensees.”
74
 Although the Posturegrid might have been 
important to the quality of the trademarked product, concealment of the rebates 
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See 9 ANTITRUST ¶ 1727d for a different question: If the tying seller's only interest in the tied 
market is an access fee or commission from the seller of the tied product, is the tie covered by the so-
called per se rule against tying? If not, a defense for quality control would not ordinarily be in issue. 
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Ohio-Sealy Mattress Mfg. Co. v. Sealy, 585 F.2d 821 (7th Cir. 1978), cert. denied, 440 U.S. 930 
(1979). 
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Id. at 833. The specifications also included several components from approved suppliers (including 
Sealy subsidiaries) who paid similar royalties to Sealy. 
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suggested otherwise, and the jury could have believed “that Sealy forced the use of the 
Posturegrid and was paid handsomely by Universal simply for creating a captive market 
in which it could and did charge a premium price.”
75
 
Nevertheless, this easy negative answer is overly simple. We must look behind the 
fact of prima facie illegality to its rationale. If the rationale is the fact or danger of 
substantial foreclosure disrupting the vitality of competition in the second market rather 
than incremental profit for the defendant, those dangers need not be (and usually are 
not) increased by an approval fee. An approval fee works either to charge customers 
according to their volume of tied purchases
76
 or to appropriate some excess profits from 
suppliers of tied products.
77
 These effects are not grounds for condemning ties
78
 and 
have not been the central concerns of existing doctrine.
79
 
Thus, the treatment of approval fees depends on both the underlying rationales for 
condemning tie-ins and on the severity of that prohibition. Existing doctrine refuses to 
confine anti-tying rules closely to dangerous foreclosures and regards defenses as 
narrow and exceptional. In that context, approval fees tend to defeat a quality-protection 
affirmative defense. If and when doctrine is reformed to focus heavily on the magnitude 
of the foreclosure, then approval fees become legally irrelevant except to whatever 
extent they might possibly impair the vitality of competition in the tied market. 
Number of Approvals 
Much of what has just been said applies also to the number of approvals. Of course, 
the least intrusive solution of a genuine quality-control problem allows customers to take 
the tied product from numerous alternative sources. So long as an insubstantial share of 
the tied market is foreclosed, the only detriment flowing from fewer approvals is that the 
alternative sources might be so few as to behave noncompetitively. The tied customers 
might therefore be denied the benefits of fully competitive prices on the tied product 
standing alone, as just discussed in connection with approval fees. 
Given the hostility of existing doctrine, which regards justifications as exceptional 
and denies any general entitlement to restrict access to the tied customers, a quality 
control defense would not save an exclusion of qualified suppliers. Thus, unless the 
number of approvals itself defeats prima facie illegality by negating a tie's existence or 
effects, a defendant justifying an otherwise illegal tie on the ground of approved 
alternative sources cannot limit their number as such. 
                                                          
75
Sealy, 585 F.2d at 835. The court added, “Even if the Posturegrid was a superior product, such an 
arrangement was unlawful.” Ibid. That is, Sealy would still be collecting a commission for allowing 
access to the tied licensees, not for any secret or patent that Sealy owned. Indeed, Sealy officials had 
referred “to the charge as a royalty for the privilege of supplying Sealy licensees” or “as a royalty, a 
commission, or a load charge.” Id. at 834 n.20. 
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See 9 ANTITRUST ¶ 1711b1. 
77
See 9 ANTITRUST ¶ 1715f. 
78
See id. at ¶¶ 1710–1715. 
79
See id. at ¶ 1704. 
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Protection or Misuse of Trade Secrets 
The Problem 
Requiring specifications as a less restrictive alternative can burden suppliers with 
another cost that is seldom, if ever, noted in the decided cases: uncompensated 
disclosure of trade secrets. Can Colonel Sanders disclose his “secret recipe” for 
Kentucky Fried Chicken to hundreds (or thousands) of franchisees without effectively 
putting it in the public domain and thereby losing its exclusive use? Or consider Coca 
Cola's syrup formula. If a tie-in of bottling franchises to the syrup were alleged, should 
an otherwise acceptable quality-control defense be denied on the ground that the 
defendant had the alternative of disclosing the syrup formula to all its franchisee-
distributors? Can a machine maker supply highly detailed service manuals to its 
customers without giving away proprietary trade secrets concerning the details of the 
machine's construction and operation? 
Recall the computer maker burdened with the costs of discovering and correcting 
malfunctions in its guaranteed software when used with other computers not completely 
identical to its own.
80
 Rather than require its software customers to buy their computers 
from it, the defendant might, the court suggested, publish the details of its computers so 
that rivals could copy them exactly. 
Four issues arise. First, is a real and significant trade secret at stake? Second, 
would disclosure have the effect of putting a trade secret into the public domain, thereby 
destroying its value? If so, it should not be deemed a less restrictive alternative that 
defeats an otherwise available quality-control defense to a tie-in. Third, if disclosure is 
otherwise appropriate, may a defendant charge a royalty for the disclosure? The answer 
should be affirmative. Fourth, even if the secret can be maintained and charged for, 
should disclosure be required? 
Actual and Continuing Secret 
Consider whether there is any significant secret that would be lost by providing 
specifications to customers—focusing on the recipe of a franchisor like Colonel Sanders 
and on the service manual of a machine maker. In each instance, do trade secrets exist, 
have they already been compromised, and would covenants against disclosure protect 
them? 
Because trade secrets include everything useful to one firm but unknown to its rival, 
they are everywhere in some degree. Notwithstanding other motives, therefore, a tying 
seller may glibly claim that using specifications to protect product quality would destroy 
a trade secret. Such a claim is sometimes a transparent subterfuge. For example, a 
chicken recipe may not be secret at all when franchisees observe or consumers taste 
one bay leaf, five peppercorns, and a dash of marjoram. In such a case, solicitude for 
trade secrets cannot itself defeat the specifications alternative to the tie as a means of 
protecting product quality. On the other hand, few would doubt the secrecy and 
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See Data Gen. Corp. Antitrust Litig., 490 F. Supp. 1089 (N.D. Cal. 1980) (defense not established), 
ultimately condemned, 734 F.2d 336 (9th Cir. 1984), cert. denied, 473 U.S. 908 (1985). 
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importance of Coca Cola's syrup formula. In intermediate situations, the tribunal must 
consider evidence about knowledge outside the company of the alleged secret or about 
the relative ease with which outsiders can lawfully discover the secret by merely 
examining the product or otherwise. The defendant company itself may have spread 
knowledge of a one-time trade secret so far that rivals know or can easily discover it, 
such that it is no longer a secret. Suppose, for example, that a machine maker has 
already provided a detailed service manual—which it now claims discloses secrets 
about the construction and operation of its machine—to 5,000 installers and repairers. 
Can something really be secret when 5,000 people know it? Even if they are all sworn 
to secrecy, loose talk and lost manuals tend to spread knowledge, at least when others 
seek it out. 
Such a machine maker faces an additional obstacle. It might argue that tight security 
with the documents and covenants against employee disclosure have in fact preserved 
the secrets of its machine's construction and operation. That claim may imply that 
similar security and covenants would preserve secrecy when specifications are spread 
more widely, although outsiders may feel less loyalty to the defendant than its own 
employees. 
Royalties 
If the defendant makes trade secrets available to customers in place of a tie or to 
rivals to enable them to supply tied customers—either because it chooses to do so or 
because it will otherwise be condemned for tying illegally—it is clearly entitled to charge 
a fee for the disclosure, such as a share of the rival's revenues from sales benefitting 
from the disclosure. The problem, of course, is that such a fee may disguise a forbidden 
approval royalty when no real secret has been disclosed or a single-source tie when the 
fee exceeds the value of the disclosure. 
Because the tying seller might plausibly have some tying- or tied-product knowledge 
useful to an outside supplier of the tied product, a sham trade secret license will appear 
genuine. When tied customers can profitably be charged a premium above the perfectly 
competitive price for the second product, other suppliers would be willing to pay for 
access to them—perhaps almost as much as the full premium itself. Such suppliers will 
thus buy a “license” for a “trade secret” they know to be fictitious or trivial. Such a 
license is nothing more than a sham for the payment of a forbidden approval fee, 
although it cannot easily be distinguished from the license of a genuinely valuable trade 
secret. 
The existence of such a secret does not end the tribunal's problems. The royalty 
might still exceed its value and thus extract a mere approval fee for access to the tied 
customers. Or it might so exceed the value of the secret or access as, in effect, to be a 
refusal to approve anyone. In the latter event, the alternative-source option is itself a 
fiction. This brings us to an antitrust topic that attracts confusion: the “reasonable 
royalty.” Although the quoted phrase hints at competitive level returns, the holder of a 
valuable secret or patent is entitled to the full value that the market places upon it. This 
is clearest in the case of patents, which are government grants designed to guarantee 
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their monopoly value to the inventor.
81
 That other holders of property are also entitled to 
its market value is demonstrated by the routine holding that an otherwise lawful 
monopolist does not violate the antitrust laws by charging the monopoly price.
82
 To the 
extent, if any, that anti-tying law requires one to make trade secrets available to others, 
the rationale is the avoidance of undue foreclosure, not the expropriation of trade 
secrets. 
Conclusion: Trade Secrets Protected 
Once a tie is determined to serve the legitimate interest of protecting product quality, 
such a defense should not be rejected on the ground that the defendant has available a 
less restrictive alternative of giving away a valuable trade secret. Tying doctrine would 
be very severe indeed if it refused to recognize a legitimate business problem on the 
grounds that the firm can solve it by surrendering its trade secrets without full 
compensation. Even if appropriate compensation can be guaranteed, it seems doubtful 
that disclosure of a trade secret should be required at all. The rationale for objecting to a 
tie-in in the first place is that it excludes producers of equivalent second products. If 
there are no such producers, there is no exclusion. Nothing in tying doctrine requires 
the tying seller to create rival suppliers by instructing them what to make (specifications) 
or how to make it (secret know-how). 
Thus, the proper role of specifications as an alternative to tying is solely to instruct 
customers how to protect the quality of the tying product by using a second product that 
other suppliers already make or can readily make without the aid of the tying seller. The 
problem, of course, is that without additional information the customer may not be able 
to tell which rival product is the equivalent of the tying seller's second product. The 
courts that have insisted upon disclosing such information to customers or rivals have 
not addressed the trade secret issue, probably because no significant secret appeared 
to be present. 
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See 3A ANTITRUST ¶ 720. 
